ouroboros-consensus-0.18.0.0: Consensus layer for the Ouroboros blockchain protocol
Safe HaskellSafe-Inferred
LanguageHaskell2010

Test.Ouroboros.Consensus.ChainGenerator.Adversarial

Synopsis

Generating

data AdversarialRecipe base hon Source #

Named arguments for checkAdversarialRecipe

Constructors

AdversarialRecipe 

Fields

  • arHonest ∷ !(ChainSchema base hon)

    The honest chain to branch off of

  • arParams ∷ (Kcp, Scg, Delta)

    protocol parameters

  • arPrefix ∷ !(Var hon ActiveSlotE)

    Where to branch off of arHonest

    It is the amount of blocks shared by the honest and the adversarial chain. In other words, the 0-based index of their intersection in blocks, such that

    • 0 identifies the genesis block
    • 1 identifies the first block in arHonest
    • 2 identifies the second block in arHonest
    • etc

Instances

Instances details
Read (AdversarialRecipe base hon) Source # 
Instance details

Defined in Test.Ouroboros.Consensus.ChainGenerator.Adversarial

Show (AdversarialRecipe base hon) Source # 
Instance details

Defined in Test.Ouroboros.Consensus.ChainGenerator.Adversarial

Methods

showsPrecIntAdversarialRecipe base hon → ShowS #

showAdversarialRecipe base hon → String #

showList ∷ [AdversarialRecipe base hon] → ShowS #

Eq (AdversarialRecipe base hon) Source # 
Instance details

Defined in Test.Ouroboros.Consensus.ChainGenerator.Adversarial

Methods

(==)AdversarialRecipe base hon → AdversarialRecipe base hon → Bool #

(/=)AdversarialRecipe base hon → AdversarialRecipe base hon → Bool #

data CheckedAdversarialRecipe base hon adv Source #

Image of checkAdversarialRecipe when it accepts the recipe

Constructors

UnsafeCheckedAdversarialRecipe 

Fields

  • carHonest ∷ !(ChainSchema base hon)

    The honest chain to branch off of

  • carParams ∷ (Kcp, Scg, Delta)

    protocol parameters

  • carWin ∷ !(Contains SlotE hon adv)

    The window starting at the first slot after the intersection and ending at the last slot of carHonest.

    INVARIANT: there is at least one active honest slot in adv

    In other words, the adversarial leader schedule does not extend the chain represented by carHonest, it competes with it.

Instances

Instances details
Read (CheckedAdversarialRecipe base hon adv) Source # 
Instance details

Defined in Test.Ouroboros.Consensus.ChainGenerator.Adversarial

Show (CheckedAdversarialRecipe base hon adv) Source # 
Instance details

Defined in Test.Ouroboros.Consensus.ChainGenerator.Adversarial

Methods

showsPrecIntCheckedAdversarialRecipe base hon adv → ShowS #

showCheckedAdversarialRecipe base hon adv → String #

showList ∷ [CheckedAdversarialRecipe base hon adv] → ShowS #

Eq (CheckedAdversarialRecipe base hon adv) Source # 
Instance details

Defined in Test.Ouroboros.Consensus.ChainGenerator.Adversarial

Methods

(==)CheckedAdversarialRecipe base hon adv → CheckedAdversarialRecipe base hon adv → Bool #

(/=)CheckedAdversarialRecipe base hon adv → CheckedAdversarialRecipe base hon adv → Bool #

data NoSuchAdversarialChainSchema Source #

Image of checkAdversarialRecipe when it rejects the recipe

Constructors

NoSuchAdversarialBlock

There is no slot the adversary can lead

Two possible reasons, where X is the slot of arPrefix and Y is the youngest slot of arHonest.

  • The interval [X, Y) is empty.
  • k=0

Suppose k=0 and slot x and slot y are two honest active slots with only honest empty slots between them.

Length of Competing Chains prohibits the adversary from leading in the interval (x,y].

In fact, by induction, the adversary can never lead: suppose the same y and a slot z are two honest active slots with only honest empty slots between them...

NoSuchCompetitor

not (arPrefix < C) where C is the number of active slots in arHonest

NoSuchIntersection

not (0 <= arPrefix <= C) where C is the number of active slots in arHonest

uniformAdversarialChain Source #

Arguments

∷ ∀ g base hon adv. RandomGen g 
Maybe Asc

Nothing means 1

CheckedAdversarialRecipe base hon adv 
→ g 
ChainSchema base adv 

Generate an adversarial ChainSchema that satifies checkExtendedRaceAssumption

The distribution this function samples from is not simple to describe. It begins by drawing a sample of length adv from the Bernoulli process induced by the active slot coefficient Asc. (IE adv many i.i.d. samples from Uniform(f)). Then it visits the Extended Praos Race Windows that overlap with the prefix of that leader schedule that ends one stability window after the first (remaining) active adversarial slot in it. In each such Window, it removes the youngest active slots from the adversarial leader schedule until it loses that Race.

Finally, it ensures that the density of the alternative schema is less than the density of the honest schema in the first stability window after the intersection.

Testing

data AdversarialViolation hon adv Source #

Constructors

BadAnchor !AnchorViolation 
BadCount

The schema does not contain a positive number of active slots

BadRace !(RaceViolation hon adv) 
BadDensity (SomeWindow RaceLbl adv SlotE) Int Int

The density of the adversarial schema is higher than the density of the honest schema in the first stability window after the intersection.

In BadDensity w h a, w is a prefix of the first stability window after the intersection where the density is higher in the adversarial schema. h is the amount of active slots in w in the honest schema. a is the amount of active slots in w in the adversarial schema.

data ChainSchema base inner Source #

The leader schedule of an honest chain

The represented chain grows by one block per active slot. A different data type would represent a leader schedule in which leaders do not necessarily extend the block from the previous active slot.

INVARIANT: at least one active slot

Constructors

ChainSchema !(Contains SlotE base inner) !(Vector inner SlotE S) 

Instances

Instances details
Read (ChainSchema base inner) Source # 
Instance details

Defined in Test.Ouroboros.Consensus.ChainGenerator.Honest

Methods

readsPrecIntReadS (ChainSchema base inner) #

readListReadS [ChainSchema base inner] #

readPrecReadPrec (ChainSchema base inner) #

readListPrecReadPrec [ChainSchema base inner] #

Show (ChainSchema base inner) Source # 
Instance details

Defined in Test.Ouroboros.Consensus.ChainGenerator.Honest

Methods

showsPrecIntChainSchema base inner → ShowS #

showChainSchema base inner → String #

showList ∷ [ChainSchema base inner] → ShowS #

Eq (ChainSchema base inner) Source # 
Instance details

Defined in Test.Ouroboros.Consensus.ChainGenerator.Honest

Methods

(==)ChainSchema base inner → ChainSchema base inner → Bool #

(/=)ChainSchema base inner → ChainSchema base inner → Bool #

data RaceViolation hon adv Source #

A violation of Races Before Acceleration Assumption

INVARIANT: windowLast rvAdv < windowLast rvHon + Delta

INVARIANT: windowStart rvHon <= windowStart rvAdv

Constructors

AdversaryWonRace 

Fields

  • rvAdv ∷ !(Race adv)

    The adversarial race window

  • rvHon ∷ !(Race hon)

    The honest race window

Instances

Instances details
Read (RaceViolation hon adv) Source # 
Instance details

Defined in Test.Ouroboros.Consensus.ChainGenerator.Adversarial

Show (RaceViolation hon adv) Source # 
Instance details

Defined in Test.Ouroboros.Consensus.ChainGenerator.Adversarial

Methods

showsPrecIntRaceViolation hon adv → ShowS #

showRaceViolation hon adv → String #

showList ∷ [RaceViolation hon adv] → ShowS #

Eq (RaceViolation hon adv) Source # 
Instance details

Defined in Test.Ouroboros.Consensus.ChainGenerator.Adversarial

Methods

(==)RaceViolation hon adv → RaceViolation hon adv → Bool #

(/=)RaceViolation hon adv → RaceViolation hon adv → Bool #

checkAdversarialChain ∷ ∀ base hon adv. AdversarialRecipe base hon → ChainSchema base adv → Except (AdversarialViolation hon adv) () Source #

Check the chain matches the given AdversarialRecipe.

  • It must intersect the honest chain at an active slot
  • It must satisfy the Races Before Acceleration Assumption (which implies the Length of Competing Chains Assumption)

Definition of a Praos Race Window of a chain. It is an interval of slots that contains at least k+1 blocks of the chain and exactly Delta slots after the k+1st block.

Definition of the Length of Competing Chains Assumption. We assume every adversarial chain contains at most k blocks in the Praos Race Window anchored at the the intersection.

Definition of Acceleration Lower Bound of an Adversarial Chain. It is the lowest slot at which an adversary could speed up its elections on a given adversarial chain. It is defined as the Scg-th slot after the first adversarial block or the Delta-th slot after the k+1st honest block after the intersection, whichever is greater.

Definition of the Races Before Acceleration Assumption. Every adversarial chain has at most k blocks in every Praos Race Window of the honest chain that starts after the intersection and ends before the acceleration lower bound.

Definition of the Genesis Implication Conjecture. We conjecture that assuming that the Genesis window length is no greater than the Stability Window and that every possible adversarial chain satisfies the Races in Stability Windows Assumption, then the honest chain strictly wins every possible density comparison from the Ouroboros Genesis paper. The key intuition is that a less dense chain would have to lose at least one Praos race within the Genesis window.

genPrefixBlockCountRandomGen g ⇒ HonestRecipe → g → ChainSchema base hon → Var hon 'ActiveSlotE Source #

Draw a random active slot count for the prefix of a fork.

The result is guaranteed to leave more than k active slots after the intersection in the honest and the adversarial chains. See Note [Minimum schema length] in Test.Ouroboros.Consensus.ChainGenerator.Honest for the rationale of the precondition.

PRECONDITION: schemaSize schedH >= s + d + k + 1